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Modeling undetected live poliovirus circulation
after apparent interruption of transmission:
implications for surveillance and vaccination
Dominika A Kalkowska1,2, Radboud J Duintjer Tebbens1, Mark A Pallansch3, Stephen L Cochi4,
Steven G F Wassilak4 and Kimberly M Thompson1,5*
Abstract
Background: Most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation,
which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission. Previous simple models
based on hypothetical populations assumed perfect detection of symptomatic cases and suggested the need to observe
no paralytic cases from wild polioviruses (WPVs) for approximately 3-4 years to achieve 95% confidence about eradication,
but the complexities in real populations and the imperfect nature of surveillance require consideration.
Methods: We revisit the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation using a more comprehensive model that reflects
the conditions in a number of places with different characteristics related to WPV transmission, and we model the actual
environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in 2013. We consider the analogous potential for undetected
transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The model explicitly accounts for the impact of different
vaccination activities before and after the last detected case of paralytic polio, different levels of surveillance, variability in
transmissibility and neurovirulence among serotypes, and the possibility of asymptomatic participation in transmission by
previously-vaccinated or infected individuals.
Results: We find that prolonged circulation in the absence of cases and thus undetectable by case-based surveillance
may occur if vaccination keeps population immunity close to but not over the threshold required for the interruption of
transmission, as may occur in northwestern Nigeria for serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus in the
event of insufficient tOPV use. Participation of IPV-vaccinated individuals in asymptomatic fecal-oral transmission
may also contribute to extended transmission undetectable by case-based surveillance, as occurred in Israel. We
also find that gaps or quality issues in surveillance could significantly reduce confidence about actual disruption.
Maintaining high population immunity and high-quality surveillance for several years after the last detected polio
cases will remain critical elements of the polio end game.
Conclusions: Countries will need to maintain vigilance in their surveillance for polioviruses and recognize that
their risks of undetected circulation may differ as a function of their efforts to manage population immunity and
to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses.
Keywords: Disease outbreaks, Disease transmission, Models, Statistical, Poliomyelitis, Poliovirus, Surveillance, Risk
assessment, Vaccination
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Background
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) continues
to make progress toward eliminating all paralytic cases
caused by wild polioviruses (WPVs). The GPEI primarily
relies on routine immunization (RI) and supplemental
immunization activities (SIAs) using the live, attenuated
oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), [1,2] a comprehensive
surveillance system, and aggressive outbreak response
[3,4]. Typical estimates suggest that permanent paralytic
poliomyelitis may occur at a ratio of approximately 1
case per 200 WPV serotype 1 (WPV1) infections on
average in immunologically naïve (i.e., fully susceptible)
individuals [2,5], with lower ratios around 1 in 2000 and
1 in 1000 for WPV2 and WPV3, respectively [5-7].
Previously vaccinated or infected individuals can also
become asymptomatically infected and potentially par-
ticipate in poliovirus transmission despite remaining
protected from paralytic poliomyelitis, [7-9] which ef-
fectively decreases the overall apparent paralysis-to-
infection ratio for the entire population. The use of
OPV leads to a very small fraction of vaccine recipients
(or their close contacts) developing vaccine-associated
paralytic polio (VAPP) at historical rates of approxi-
mately 1 case per 2.5 million doses distributed in the
United States [10] and 2.9-4.7 cases per million births
worldwide in OPV-using countries, giving an esti-
mated global burden of about 300-500 cases per year
[11]. In addition, as a small mRNA virus, OPV can lose
its attenuating mutations and vaccine-related viruses
revert back toward WPV to become a circulating
vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV), which occurs in
the context of prolonged circulation in populations
with high susceptibility and can lead to outbreaks [12].
Moreover, in a very small number of individuals with
B-cell immunodeficiencies, receiving OPV can lead to
prolonged or chronic infections and the development
of immune deficient vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs)
[13]. Given these complications, the GPEI expects to coord-
inate the cessation of OPV use after global eradication of
WPVs to minimize the risks associated with live poliovi-
ruses (LPVs, i.e., WPVs, VDPVs, OPVs, and OPV-related vi-
ruses) [4,14]. At that time, inactivated poliovirus vaccine
(IPV) [15] will represent the only vaccine option [16]. How-
ever, OPV cessation of any given serotype cannot safely
occur until assurance of global interruption of transmission
of that serotype. Because the majority of poliovirus infec-
tions occur asymptomatically, the possibility of silent circu-
lation complicates the confirmation of local and global
interruption of WPV or cVDPV transmission.
A previous statistical analysis [17] and a mathematical
infection transmission model of a simple and small
hypothetical population [18] that assumed perfect sur-
veillance suggested that it takes approximately 3-4 years
without WPV-caused paralytic cases to achieve 95%
confidence about the interruption of transmission. A re-
analysis of one of these studies [18] demonstrated how
varying assumptions that reflect actual conditions about
population immunity, vaccination strategies, and sea-
sonal fluctuations in transmissibility impact estimates of
the probability and duration of silent circulation [19].
The reanalysis also identified the need to consider the
role of previously-vaccinated or infected individuals (i.e.,
partially infectible individuals) who remain immune to
paralytic disease, but not to reinfection, and their poten-
tial participation in silent transmission of the virus
[19,20]. The reanalysis confirmed the importance of the
paralysis-to-infection ratio (PIR) as a key input, [18,19]
which suggests the need to perform separate analyses for
each serotype. While the reanalysis provided several in-
sights relevant to current conditions, it relied on a
hypothetical population, the use of a highly-simplified
transmission model that included either OPV or IPV,
and it did not account for imperfect surveillance [19].
In this paper, we seek to characterize the confidence
about no circulation as a function of time without de-
tected events (i.e., cases or positive sewage samples) in
populations with relatively recent circulation. We model
populations that may represent conditions like the actual
last global reservoirs of WPV transmission and the actual
environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in
2013. Prior to discussing the model and methods, the next
section provides an overview of the different components
of polio surveillance, which provides important context
about the types, quality, and timing of information
available.
Poliovirus surveillance
Fully susceptible individuals (i.e., those never infected
with LPVs or never successfully IPV-vaccinated) can be-
come paralyzed following infection with a LPV and
present with acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) caused by
polio. In contrast, partially infectible individuals (i.e.,
those who acquired immunity from prior LPV infections
or successful IPV doses) benefit from complete, perman-
ent protection from paralytic poliomyelitis; however, we
call them “partially infectible” to indicate that they can
become re-infected and participate to some degree in
poliovirus transmission (depending on their immunity
state and extent of mucosal immunity waning). Figure 1
shows an overview (Figure 1a) and the various compo-
nents (Figure 1b-d) of poliovirus surveillance. Poliovirus
surveillance can include efforts to detect AFP cases and
analyze their stool samples to look for poliovirus (i.e.,
the AFP surveillance system shown in the top box in
Figure 1a with the details given in Figure 1b), efforts to
collect biological samples (e.g., stool, serum, oropharyn-
geal) from selected individuals not presenting with AFP
to look for evidence of recent poliovirus infection (i.e.,
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(a) (b)Overview and types of LPV infections detected by each component of surveillance indicated in a box (with full schematic Figure 
location indicated as 1b-1d)
LPV infection in fully
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LPV infections in partially
infectible people
AFP surveillance system
(1b)
Supplemental human
surveillance system (1c)
Environmental
surveillance system (1d)
Red bold text used for surveillance system outputs
Black underlined text used to indicate policies
Blue arrows show the direction of influences, hash marks (double
horizontal parallel lines) in the arrow indicate a delay of (d) time
i (di) (see Notes)
Black plain text indicates intermediate quantities or
other inputs affecting behavior
Key to formatting used in Figures 1b-1d
AFP surveillance system details
AFP cases
from LPVs
AFP cases
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detecting AFP case
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Figure 1 Schematic of poliovirus surveillance. (a). Overview and sources of LPV infections detected by each component of surveillance indicated in a box (with full schematic Figure location indicated
as 1b-1d). (b). AFP surveillance system details. (c). Supplemental human surveillance system details. (d). Environmental surveillance system details. Notes: blue arrows show the direction of the influence; hash
marks (double horizontal parallel lines) in the arrow indicate a delay of (d) time i (di); d1, time from onset of infection to onset of paralysis (incubation period); d2, time to detect AFP case in the field; d3, time
to collect sample and ship sample to laboratory; d4,time to confirm WPV in specimen; d5, time to confirm VDPV in specimen; d6, time to confirm Sabin-like virus in specimen; d7, time to confirm the absence
ofpoliovirus in specimen; d8, time of clinical follow-up; d9, time of VDPV follow-up investigation (varies such that d9a < d9b << d9c); d10, time for non-polioAFP reporting and averaging; d11, time of effective
surveillance intensity ramp-up (if confirmed cases increase) or decrease (in the absence of confirmed cases);d12, time to recover from infection; d13; dilution time; d14, time between sample collection; APF,
acute flaccid paralysis; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine;LPV, live poliovirus; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; VDPV, vaccine-derived poliovirus (preceded by “c” to specify circulating VDPV, “i” to specify virus froman
immunocompromised long-term excretor, or “a” to indicate an ambiguous source (i.e., not classifiable as “c” or “i”); WPV, wild poliovirus
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human supplemental surveillance shown in the middle
box in Figure 1a with the details given shown in Figure 1c),
or efforts to collect sewage samples to detect the presence
of poliovirus excretion by individuals in the catchment area
(i.e., environmental surveillance shown in the bottom box
in Figure 1a with the details given in Figure 1d). We include
a key to interpreting the information in Figure 1b-d to the
right of the boxes with the various components in Figure 1a,
and notes at the bottom that provide the details of abbrevi-
ations. Throughout the various poliovirus surveillance sys-
tems, delays exist that limit the ability to rapidly confirm
the presence of a WPV or cVDPV. Figure 1 indicates delays
in the system using hash marks on the blue arrows labeled
with di, where i represents a number that corresponds to
the specific delay defined in the notes at the bottom.
The Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) repre-
sents one of the most sophisticated laboratory resources
in the world, and it continues to develop technologies
that improve overall surveillance quality and provide
valuable information [21]. The GPLN primarily focuses
on AFP surveillance, which analyzes stool samples from
AFP cases detected through active field surveillance for
the presence of poliovirus. The information from the
AFP surveillance system depends on the field and la-
boratory policies and OPV use policies, which along
with WPV circulation impact overall LPV circulation.
The GPLN analyzes stool samples from detected AFP
cases and provides numerous information outputs (i.e.,
shown using red bold text in Figure 1b), including the
incidence of virologically-confirmed WPV and VDPV
paralytic polio cases, AFP cases with Sabin-like (i.e.,
closely-related to OPV) poliovirus, polio-compatible
cases (i.e., clinically compatible with poliomyelitis, but
no adequate specimens available to virologically-confirm
or disconfirm polio), and non-polio AFP cases (Figure 1b)
[22]. A determination of “adequate” for samples from an
AFP case requires obtaining “two stool specimens of suf-
ficient quantity for laboratory analysis, collected at least
24 hours apart, within 14 days after the onset of paraly-
sis, and arriving in the laboratory by reverse cold chain
and with proper documentation [23].” Isolation of a
VDPV case triggers further investigation, which then
identifies the case as a confirmed cVDPV case, a confirmed
immunodeficient prolonged or chronic excretor (i.e.,
iVDPV) case, or an isolated case with an ambiguous
source (i.e., aVDPV case). Isolation of a Sabin-like
virus from an AFP case after epidemiological and clin-
ical follow-up and expert review can lead to designa-
tion of the case as a confirmed VAPP case. Several
factors affect the overall efficiency and reliability of
the AFP surveillance system, [24] including the prob-
ability of detecting AFP cases in the field, which de-
pends on the rate at which the system detects the
“background” occurrence of non-polio AFP cases,
timeliness, quantity and quality of specimen collec-
tion, proportion of cases with inadequate specimens
receiving clinical follow-up, and the laboratory sensi-
tivity of detecting a virus from an LPV-infected AFP
case with adequate specimens. Significant variability
may exist within the system (e.g., the laboratory con-
firmation process in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia
ranged from 4 to 10 weeks in 2003-06 [25]). Extensive
performance criteria and active quality control moni-
toring for the GPLN and AFP surveillance system [22]
require that the annual AFP rate should exceed 1/100,000
people under 15 years of age in the catchment area [26].
The GPLN also requires the investigation of at least 80%
of cases, which must occur within 48 hours of notification
and include the collection of 2 adequate stool specimens
obtained 24-48 hours apart within 14 days of the onset of
paralysis [26]. In some places, surveillance includes the
collection of adequate stool specimens from 5 or more
neighborhood contacts of cases with inadequate stool
specimens [27]. Higher non-polio AFP rates in any given
population indicate a lower probability of missing clinical
cases (i.e., higher sensitivity). However, heterogeneity of
the non-polio AFP rate may imply effectively lowered sen-
sitivity if low non-polio AFP rates correlate with the places
most likely to incur polio cases.
Supplemental human surveillance activities, which in-
clude stool sampling from individuals without paralytic
symptoms but with elevated probability of poliovirus ex-
cretion (e.g., contacts of AFP cases, meningitis cases)
and/or serologic surveys, may also provide poliovirus
surveillance information as shown in Figure 1c. High
non-polio AFP rates (e.g., exceeding 2/100,000) may in-
dicate effectively expanded case definitions and imply a
higher probability of randomly detecting polioviruses
that did not cause paralysis (i.e., lower specificity). Sero-
logical surveillance can detect evidence of a history of
any poliovirus exposure, including any LPV infection
and vaccination with OPV or IPV, but it cannot identify
the virus or time of the exposure, and thus it currently
cannot reliably detect circulation as it occurs. However,
after OPV cessation, serological surveillance or targeted
stool surveys may offer the ability to detect evidence of
recent or ongoing LPV circulation, and consequently we
include Figure 1c for completeness.
Figure 1d provides a schematic for environmental sur-
veillance, which can offer a more sensitive signal than
AFP surveillance, particularly in communities with no
clinical cases of polio [23,28-33]. The use of OPV com-
plicates environmental surveillance, because widespread
OPV infections imply that many samples will contain
LPVs (mostly Sabin-like viruses), indicating the need for
additional processing to screen out OPV-related viruses.
However, studies demonstrate the utility of environmen-
tal surveillance with respect to measuring the length of
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poliovirus persistence in the environment after OPV vac-
cination campaigns and after a national switch from
OPV to IPV for RI. Many countries currently use environ-
mental surveillance routinely (e.g., Afghanistan, China,
Egypt, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Russia and some former Soviet states, several European
countries) although the systems differ considerably [34].
Significant advantages of environmental surveillance in-
clude the potential to detect silent circulation of WPVs
and cVDPVs before any AFP cases occur (e.g., Egypt, [35]
India, [36] Israel [37]). Experience in India demonstrates
that careful selection of sampling sites with open sewers in
highly-populated or high-risk areas can overcome the
limitation of inadequate sewage networks [36]. The value
of environmental surveillance with respect to early detection
and the opportunity to prevent any cases using vaccination be-
came clear in early 2013 when Israel detected the circulation
of WPV1 in the absence of any evidence of clinical cases [37].
All of the factors that influence poliovirus surveillance
sensitivity for all components may change over time. For
example, after the detection of the first case in an out-
break, sensitivity of detection of subsequent cases typic-
ally increases due to intensification of all aspects of
surveillance. Similarly, surveillance sensitivity may de-
crease with time after the last detected case. Detection
of a WPV in a population depends on the probability of
detecting at least one infected person from a population
with WPV circulating, [38,39] but although the case may
not necessarily occur in that population (e.g., on-going
circulation of WPV in Sudan following isolation of a
positive sewage sample taken in Egypt). Despite the ex-
tensive efforts to ensure high-quality surveillance informa-
tion globally, gaps in surveillance still exist, particularly in
conflict areas with access limitations and in resource-poor
areas [40]. This suggests that the quality of surveillance
represents an important consideration in the context of
certifying an area as free of WPVs (or more broadly free of
LPVs). Overall poliovirus surveillance provides valuable,
but imperfect information, and this motivates the need to
consider the impacts of imperfect information in the polio
end game.
The components of the poliovirus surveillance system
result in population-specific probabilities of detection
and confirmation of the presence of poliovirus circula-
tion, which we consider as we model the confidence
about no circulation as a function of time since the last
detected event. Specifically, the model described in the
next section considers a probability of detecting and
confirming any individual paralytic case from AFP sur-
veillance and a probability of detecting and confirming
the presence of poliovirus in sewage from environmental
surveillance for each population including that type of
surveillance. While numerically modeling each surveil-
lance system in each specific population requires more
data and remains beyond the scope of this work, we
found that visualizing the relationships between the vari-
ous components helped to convey the nature of the in-
formation provided and may help inform national and
global choices that will influence overall surveillance
quality and timeliness.
Methods
We build on our understanding of poliovirus surveil-
lance and prior comprehensive poliovirus infection
transmission models [7,20,41-43] to estimate the confi-
dence about (probability of ) no circulation in each mod-
eled population as a function of the time since the last
detected event. We model populations with relatively re-
cent WPV transmission (both endemic and imported)
that rely on AFP surveillance and the actual environmental
surveillance detection of WPV serotype 1 (WPV1) that oc-
curred in Israel in 2013 [44]. Although Nigeria started some
environmental surveillance efforts in 2011, the scale of
these efforts until recently remained relatively small, and
consequently we do not consider the potential impact of
this environmental surveillance. We recognize that only in-
creasingly localized and shrinking geographic areas in three
countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan) maintain
indigenous WPV1 transmission, but importations into pre-
viously WPV-free countries continue to pose a threat of re-
established transmission and potential silent circulation, [1]
and the emergence of cVDPVs pose a real threat [12]. Con-
sequently, we focus on identifying some scenarios that rea-
sonably represent different types of areas and conditions
that warrant modeling because of their population immun-
ity, characteristics, and/or surveillance quality. Similar to
prior studies [18,19] this analysis focuses on the detection
within a closed population in which an LPV might circulate
silently (i.e., without detection).
The model divides the population according to im-
munity states, including fully susceptible individuals (i.e.,
those never infected with LPVs or successfully IPV-
vaccinated), maternally immune individuals (i.e., children
born to mothers with any active recent or historic im-
munity), and partially infectible individuals (i.e., those
who acquired immunity from 1, 2, or 3 or more prior
successful IPV doses, or from 1 or 2 or more prior LPV
infections) [7]. As noted in the prior section, partially
infectible individuals benefit from complete, permanent
protection from paralysis; however, re-infection can
occur and lead to different degrees of participation in
poliovirus transmission (depending on their immunity
state and extent of mucosal immunity waning). Only
fully susceptible and maternally immune individuals with
insufficient maternal antibodies remaining to provide
protection can become paralyzed when infected with a
LPV for the first time. The model includes a 6-stage in-
fection process, a 5-stage immunity waning process, and a
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20-stage poliovirus reversion process for both fecal-oral
and oropharyngeal routes of transmission. We divide the
population into a number of age groups that varies de-
pending on the modeled situation. However, regardless of
the scenario settings we combine the age groups into 3
preferentially mixing age groups (i.e. 0-4, 5-14, and 15 or
more years) [7,20,41-43]. We characterize population im-
munity to poliovirus transmission by computing the age-
and-sub-population-mixing-adjusted effective immune
proportion (EIPM) [42]. We also define an immunity
threshold, EIP*, which depends on the basic reproductive
number for the population and virus serotype (R0), with
EIP* = (1- 1/R0). For EIPM > EIP* infections eventually
die out [42]. We use the EIPM and R0 to estimate the
net reproductive number (Rn), defined as (1-EIPM) ×
R0, which represents the average number of secondary
transmissions generated by a single infection given the
population immunity at the time Rn has a threshold of
1 regardless of the assumed R0 for a population and
serotype. Thus, for Rn > 1 (i.e., EIPM < EIP*) continued
transmission can occur, while for Rn < 1 transmission will
die out (i.e., EIPM > EIP*). We model 4 populations (i.e.,
qualitatively different conditions related to the transmis-
sion potential, expected population immunity at the time
of WPV1 or WPV3 certification, OPV take rates, and sur-
veillance quality) as shown in Table 1 [41-44]. For each
population, we specify demographic information, polio-
virus transmissibility and seasonality, and the history of
live poliovirus exposure, including OPV use for RI or
SIAs. The Additional file 1 provides details about the
model, including updates for recent immunization activ-
ities and assumptions used to model die-out and
characterize population immunity. We run the existing
deterministic poliovirus transmission model for each situ-
ation and serotype up to a point in time shortly before
die-out occurs (Table 1) and then transform it to a
discrete, stochastic model that we run 1,000 times (see
Additional file 1). For the situation representing Israel, we
focus on iterations consistent with the outbreak response
that actually occurred (i.e., we only allow the iterations
with one or fewer paralytic cases occurring after mid-July
2013, because the occurrence of actual cases prior to that
date would have likely changed the outbreak response).
We synthesize the following results, similar to prior
analyses [18,19]:
 POE - the probability of eradication defined as the
fraction of stochastic iterations in which die-out
occurs (i.e., prevalence below the transmission
threshold)
 DEFP - the detected-event-free period defined as
the time in months since the last detected case
(AFP) or positive isolate (environmental
surveillance)
 CNC - confidence about no circulation given the
DEFP approximated as (1 - the number of DEFPs
equal to t months with ongoing WPV circulation,
divided by all DEFPs of t months)
 CNCx% - the time when the confidence about no
circulation exceeds x% (i.e., CNC95%, CNC99%)
 TUC - the time of undetected circulation after the
last detected-event (for those iterations in which
extinction occurs)
 TUCx% - The xth percentile of the TUC (i.e.,
TUC95%, TUC99%).
For this analysis, we focus on detected-events (i.e., detect-
ing cases from AFP surveillance and positive isolates that
indicated the presence of infections from environmental
surveillance) and the DEFP instead of the case-free period
used previously [18,19] to account for the different informa-
tion provided by the two components of poliovirus surveil-
lance used. To emphasize our focus on no circulation in
the absence of cases and in the context of less than perfect
surveillance, we use the time of undetected circulation
(TUC) rather than the time of silent circulation (TSC) as-
suming perfect surveillance used previously (i.e., TUC with
perfect surveillance equals TSC) [18,19].
We explicitly consider the impact of imperfect infor-
mation from surveillance and provide a comparison to
perfect information as a point of reference. For each
modeled situation, we define a detection function (DF)
as an indicator of overall surveillance quality and to ac-
count for imperfect surveillance. The detection function
describes the probability of detecting the ith case (pi, used
for AFP surveillance) or ith sewage sample that contains
poliovirus (si, used for environmental surveillance) in a
cluster. We define a cluster as a series of sequential de-
tected cases or sequential virus detections in sewage in a
given geographical subpopulation, with no more than one
year between successive detections. For environmental sur-
veillance, detection depends on the number of individuals
excreting poliovirus into the sewage system in a geograph-
ical subpopulation. We define the effective infectiousness-
weighted number of infectious individuals (EI) and compare
this to the threshold (EI*) required for the system to detect
the virus in the sewage. We define si as the probability of
detecting poliovirus in the ith sewage sample given that EI
> EI*. Thus, each time when sample collection should occur
(i.e., every month) we check whether the weighted number
of excreting individuals exceeds the EI*.
We characterize the different inputs for surveillance
quality assuming variable levels of quality of the (sub)na-
tional surveillance systems, with better systems receiving
relatively higher values for all pi. This framing allows for
a relatively higher probability of missing the first case,
with decreasing probabilities of missing subsequent
cases in the same temporal cluster for the fixed spatial
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area, depending on the situation-specific assumptions
(Table 1, details on methods and assumptions provided
in the Additional file 1).
Results
Figure 2 presents the confidence about no circulation as
a function of time without detected events, with black
horizontal lines at the top showing the 99% (small dots)
and 95% (larger dots) levels for reference. Each solid line
(red, green, blue) represents the result using perfect AFP
surveillance for the indicated serotype. Each dotted line
of the corresponding color presents the impact of imper-
fect AFP surveillance (Figure 2a-d) or environmental
surveillance (Figure 2e), as characterized for the different
detection functions in Table 1.
Figure 3 further demonstrates the importance of the
relationship between population immunity to transmis-
sion and undetected circulation using Rn (the Additional
file 1 shows the corresponding figures for EIPM, which
we use to characterize population immunity for reference).
Table 2 reports the CNC95%, CNC99%, TUC95% and
TUC99% for the situations assuming perfect AFP sur-
veillance only (top) and with our best estimates of actual,
imperfect surveillance quality (bottom).
Figure 2a confirms that differences in the PIRs signifi-
cantly affect the length of time required to observe para-
lytic cases, with lower values (serotype 1 > serotypetype
3 > serotypetype 2) indicating the need to wait longer be-
cause cases occur less frequently per infection [19].
Figure 3a for northern India shows Rn consistently
Table 1 List of scenario-specific model inputs
Model input Scenario 1
(Northern India)
Scenario 2
(Northwest
Nigeria)
Scenario 3
(Tajikistan)
Scenario 4 (Israel)
Population [model references] Bihar and Western Uttar
Pradesh (WUP), each state
with 8 age groups and a
preferentially-mixing
under-vaccinated subpop-
ulation [7,41,43]
7 states combined
into one population
with 11 age-groups
with an under-
vaccinated subpopu-
lation [7,42,43]**
3 administrative
regions primarily
affected by the
2010 outbreak
with 11 age
groups [7,43]
National population with 13 age groups
divided into two preferentially-mixing
geographical regions that each include a
preferentially-mixing under-vaccinated
subpopulation [44]
Qualitative characteristics
Overall transmission potential High Medium Medium Low
Population immunity High Medium Medium Medium
OPV take rate Low Medium Medium High
Surveillance quality High Medium Low High
Stochastic model start dates
Serotype 1 2008 2013 2009 2013
Serotype 2 2008 2013 - -
Serotype 3 2008 2010 - -
Average R0 (WPV1) 13 7.5 8 5
Average EIP* (WPV1) 0.92 0.87 0.88 0.80
SIA coverage (general
population)
Time series (Bihar: 0.86-
0.95; WUP: 0.84-0.94)
0.85 0.95 0.80
Average RI coverage 0.65 0.11 0.40 0.95
AFP surveillance
p = (p1,p2,…, pi)
General (0.95, 0.95, …,
0.95) Subpopulation (0.8,
0.8, …, 0.8)
General (0.80, 0.85,
0.90, …, 0.90)
General (0.20,
0.25, 0.50, 0.50,
0.73, …, 0.73)
General (0.50, 0.75, 0.95, …, 0.95)
Subpopulation
(0.54, 0.57,
0.60, …, 0.60)
Environmental surveillance
s = (s1,s2) - - - (0.30, 0.90)
Threshold (EI*) - - - South:
(60,60,60,60,60,12,12,10,13,20,20,20,20,20,20)
Rest of Israel:
(113,136,227,170,97,32,43,15,62,68,68,136,38,40,34)
Abbreviations: EIP*, threshold of effective immune proportion; R0, basic reproductive number; WPV1, wild poliovirus serotype 1
** Includes updated SIAs rounds in September 2013 and March 2014 from tOPV to bOPV; updated the current path scenario with 2 rounds using tOPV (in August
and November) for 2014 and 3 annual rounds using tOPV (in March, August and November) from 2015 forward until OPV2 cessation; updated RI coverage for
consistency with the 2013 DHS survey, [45] with relative RI coverage in the subpopulation of 20% in 2012, 25% in 2013 and 30% in 2014 and forward.
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below 1 for all three serotypes after 2010. In Figures 2b
and 2c, the curves for serotype 3 cross the curves for
serotype 2. This occurs because in the Nigeria model,
gaps in vaccination in the sub-population in 2010-
2013 gave a long tail of serotype 3 circulation with no
cases prior to die out. Given that our model assumes a
rapid ramp-up in population immunity and high sur-
veillance quality for northern India but not for north-
west Nigeria (Table 1), [41,42] the contrast between
Figures 2a and 2b shows that high population immunity
(compare Figures 3a and 3b) and high AFP surveillance
levels (Table 2) lead to significantly shorter CNCs and
TUCs. Figure 3b shows a clear risk of transmission for
serotype 2 for northwest Nigeria, with the population im-
munity for Nigeria for serotype 2 continuing to hover
around the threshold for the current path strategy for
most stochastic iterations (Figure 2b). The alternative in-
creased tOPV scenario with 4 instead of 3 tOPV rounds in
2015 allows for the earlier elimination of cVDPV2 in all
stochastic iterations (Figure 3c), which would support the
global coordination of OPV2 cessation in 2016 and further
demonstrates the importance of high population immun-
ity for reducing the duration of potential undetected circu-
lation. In contrast, continuing only 2 annual tOPV rounds
per year from 2014 forward causes population immunity
to hover around the threshold, with very long times be-
tween cases and no elimination of cVDPV2 transmis-
sion (not shown). Figures 3b and 3c also show the
relatively rapid loss of population immunity (i.e., in-
crease in Rn) for serotype 2 that occurs after OPV2
cessation (i.e., in 2016 for Figure 3c and 2017 for
Figure 3b).
Figures 2d and 2e represent importations into previ-
ously polio-free areas. Figure 2d shows an outbreak in
which many cases occurred relatively quickly leading to
relatively short intervals between cases and motivating
rapid and intensified outbreak response activities. The
outbreak response resulted in short TUCs, with 95%
 Northern India
 Northwest Nigeria 2014 current path (note change of x-axis scale)
Northwest Nigeria increased tOPV (note change of x-axis scale) 
 Tajikistan
 Israel
a)
b)
d)
e)
c)
Figure 2 Confidence about no circulation as a function of the detected-event free period and lines provided to indicate 95% and 99%
for reference. a). Northern India. b). Northwest Nigeria 2014 current path (note change of x-axis scale). c). Northwest Nigeria increased tOPV
(note change of x-axis scale). d). Tajikistan. e). Israel.
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chance of interruption of transmission within 4 months
of the last detected case (Table 2) and correspondingly
short potential undetected circulation (i.e., short CNC95%
and CNC99%). In other polio-free countries with no re-
cent polio cases, surveillance similarly may not perform
well initially, but the dynamics of the outbreak and re-
sponse may differ in other situations, leading to different
outbreak kinetics and CNCs.
Figure 2e shows a situation of WPV1 transmission detected
by environmental surveillance in the absence of any detected
paralytic cases. The solid curve in Figure 2e appears less
smooth compared to some of the other curves in Figure 2. In
approximately 50% of the stochastic iterations the virus dies
out after only a short period of circulation (i.e., it does not
“take off”), implying an exponential decrease in the probability
of undetected circulation during the first months that corre-
sponds to the exponential process of recovery of the initial in-
fections. In approximately 25% of the iterations 1 stochastic
case occurs (i.e., shortly before or sometime after the outbreak
response), which implies less than approximately 1 year
between cases. In another approximately 25% of iterations, no
cases occur despite circulation of virus for approximately
1 year. Figure 2e and Table 2 suggest that high-performing
environmental surveillance could reduce the CNC95% by
26%, depending on the frequency and effectiveness of environ-
mental sampling.
Depending on the situation-specific characteristics (e.g., the
overall population immunity, endemic versus outbreak condi-
tions, and virus serotype), the model suggests time periods of
0.5 to 3 years without circulating paralytic cases caused by
WPV or cVDPV required to achieve 95% confidence in the
interruption of transmission in the context of perfect AFP sur-
veillance (Table 2). This interval could become longer if AFP
surveillance becomes less than perfect (dotted lines in
Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d) or shorter using sensitive environ-
mental surveillance (dotted line in Figure 2e).
Discussion
Current policies require a period of at least 3 years of no
paralytic polio cases detected by the AFP surveillance
 Northern India
 Northwest Nigeria 2014 current path
Northwest Nigeria increased tOPV
 Tajikistan
 Israel
a)
b)
d)
e)
c)
Figure 3 Net reproductive number for each scenario relative to the threshold for sustained transmission (Rn* = 1) for the relevant time
period modeled. a) Northern India. b) Northwest Nigeria 2014 current path. c) Northwest Nigeria increased tOPV. d) Tajikistan. e) Israel.
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system to certify an area as free of WPV. Our analysis
suggests that specific situations and serotypes will differ
such that 3 years may imply more or less than 95% confi-
dence and demonstrating that the quality of the informa-
tion impacts the time. Policy makers should recognize
that choices made to achieve and maintain high levels of
population immunity could impact the success or failure
of polio eradication and the investment required in on-
going surveillance to ensure confidence about the absence
of silent circulation when observed cases and/or signals
from environmental surveillance stop [46,47]. Correlation
between the populations at greatest risk of undetected cir-
culation and poor surveillance quality suggest the need to
specifically focus on underserved areas. Recognizing these
areas may motivate the exploration of the development of
environmental surveillance systems that could potentially
reduce the time required to reach a high level of confi-
dence about the absence of circulation in these areas,
which will likely drive global decision making. Consider-
able variation in poliovirus surveillance activities (and the
associated population-specific values for the components
in Figures 1b-1d) leads to different degrees of quality, and
policy makers will need to consider the impacts of imper-
fect information.
Early detection of circulating infections provides an
important opportunity to increase population immunity,
decrease Rn, and prevent any cases from occurring. In
Israel, population immunity fell below the threshold and
transmission occurred, but this did not lead to cases due
to the protection from paralysis provided by high cover-
age with IPV. The ability of high coverage with IPV to
prevent cases but potentially not prevent or disrupt
transmission in some situations may decrease the ability
to detect transmission using AFP surveillance.
Serotype differences in the PIRs imply significant dif-
ferences between the relevant DEFP values, which may
influence OPV cessation policy development. For example,
the relatively low PIR of cVDPV2, if combined with insuf-
ficient population immunity against serotype 2 and het-
erogeneity in surveillance quality in regions like northwest
Nigeria, may lead to significant increases in the DEFP
values, which would indicate the need for longer periods
of time required without detected events to certify the
interruption of LPV transmission. Some countries will
need to increase population immunity prior to OPV cessa-
tion to safely stop LPV transmission and rapidly obtain
confidence about the absence of transmission.
Our analysis remains limited by the model assumptions,
including assumptions made to translate the differential-
equation based model into a stochastic model related to
use of the transmission threshold. For example, using the
criterion for die-out in this analysis represents prevalence
below the transmission threshold rather than absolute 0
total infected individuals. Nonetheless, we believe the
analysis provides useful insights relevant to the polio
endgame.
Table 2 Expected detected-event free period (DEFP) required for 95% and 99% confidence about no circulation (CNCx%)
and time of undetected circulation between the last paralytic case and die-out (TUCx%) by serotype (based on
1,000 iterations) assuming perfect surveillance (top) and imperfect surveillance (bottom)
Virus WPV1 (PIR = 1/200) cVDPV2 (PIR = 1/ 2000) WPV3 (PIR = 1/1000)
Metric CNCx% TUCx% CNCx% TUCx% CNCx% TUCx%
x% 95% 99% 95% 99% 95% 99% 95% 99% 95% 99% 95% 99%
Population DEFP values assuming perfect AFP surveillance without environmental surveillance
Northern India 0.67 0.83 0.65 0.74 1.58 2.00 1.39 1.96 0.83 0.92 0.77 0.86
Northwest Nigeria
- current path 1.00 1.25 0.98 1.23 2.08 2.67 1.95 2.28 2.83 3.58 2.61 3.53
- increased tOPV 1.08 1.25 1.01 1.24 1.50 1.67 1.36 1.58 2.92 3.58 2.65 3.53
Tajikistan 0.42 0.50 0.35 0.38 - - - - - - - -
Israel 1.25 1.42 1.19 1.36 - - - - - - - -
Population DEFP values assuming AFP surveillance with quality based on Table 1 (including environmental surveillance in Israel)
Northern India 0.67 0.83 0.66 0.77 1.75 2.25 1.51 2.19 0.83 0.92 0.80 0.87
Northwest Nigeria
- current path 1.25 1.50 1.22 1.48 2.33 2.92 2.16 2.53 3.75 4.33 3.62 4.27
- increased tOPV 1.25 1.58 1.22 1.54 1.58 1.75 1.47 1.66 3.58 4.17 3.45 4.17
Tajikistan 0.42 0.50 0.36 0.38 - - - - - - - -
Israel 0.92 1.17 0.76 1.15 - - - - - - - -
Abbreviations: CNCx%, DEFP at which the confidence about no circulation exceeds x%; cVDPV, circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; DEFP, detected-event-free
period; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; PIR, paralysis-to-infection ratio; tOPV, trivalent OPV; TUCx%, time at which the probability of undetected WPV circulation after
the true last case becomes exceeds x%; WPV, wild poliovirus.
Kalkowska et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:66 Page 10 of 12
As we consider the prerequisites for OPV cessation
and approach key decision points, countries will need to
recognize that increasing population immunity and the
actual quality of surveillance will impact the risks of un-
detected circulation and the confidence associated with
different time periods of no observed cases. The poten-
tial degradation of surveillance quality suggests the need
to ensure a commitment to high-quality surveillance and/
or requires a longer time of no detected events. Environ-
mental surveillance may provide an important opportunity
to reduce the time required to feel confident about the ab-
sence of undetected circulation, although the value of the
information provided will depend on the system design.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Technical appendix.
Abbreviations
AFP: Acute flaccid paralysis; bOPV: Bivalent OPV (serotypes 1 and 3);
CNC: Confidence about no circulation given the DEFP; CNCx%: Confidence
about no circulation exceeds x% given the DEFP; d: Delay of; di: Delay of
time i (used to distinguish types of delays that occur in various parts of polio
surveillance); d1: Time from onset of infection to onset of paralysis (incubation
period); d2: Time to detect AFP case in the field; d3: Time to collect sample and
ship sample to laboratory; d4: Time to confirm WPV in specimen; d5: Time to
confirm VDPV in specimen; d6: Time to confirm Sabin-like virus in specimen;
d7: Time to confirm the absence of poliovirus in specimen; d8: Time of clinical
follow-up; d9: Time of VDPV follow-up investigation; d10: Time of non-polio AFP
reporting and averaging delay; d11: Time of effective surveillance intensity
ramp-up (if confirmed cases increase) or decrease (in the absence of confirmed
cases); d12: Time to recover from infection; d13: Dilution time; d14: Time
between sample collection; DEFP: Detected-event-free period; DF: Detection
function; EI: The minimal number of effective infectiousness-weighted individuals
who are infectious; EI*: The threshold required to detect the virus in the sewage;
EIP*: threshold effective immune proportion; EIPM: age-and-sub-population-
mixing-adjusted effective immune proportion above which infections eventually
die out; GPEI: Global Polio Eradication Initiative; GPLN: Global Polio Laboratory
Network; IPV: Inactivated poliovirus vaccine; LPV: Live poliovirus; OPV: Oral
poliovirus vaccine; pi: Probability of detecting the i
th case in a cluster of cases;
PIR: Paralysis-to-infection ratio; POE: Probability of extinction; R0: Basic reproductive
number; RI: Routine immunization; Rn: Net reproductive number; si: The
probability of detecting poliovirus in the ith sewage sample in a cluster of
environmental detections; SIA: Supplemental immunization activity; tOPV: Trivalent
OPV; TUC: Time of undetected circulation between the last paralytic case and WPV
interruption; TUCx%: Time at which the probability of undetected WPV circulation
after the true last case exceeds x%; VAPP: Vaccine associated paralytic polio;
VDPV: Vaccine-derived poliovirus (preceded by “c” to specify circulating VDPV, “i”
to specify VDPV virus from an immunocompromised long-term excretor, or “a” to
indicate an ambiguous VDPV source (i.e., not classifiable as “c” or “i”); WPV: Wild
poliovirus.
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